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ABSTRACT
The history of space endeavors stretches far from the first
liquid-fueled rocket created by the father of modern
rocketry, Robert Goddard, in 1926 and will certainly
extend far beyond the construction of the International
Space Station (ISS) scheduled to be complete with the
addition of the Permanent Multipurpose Module on STS-
133/ULF5. National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) and the ISS International
Partners (IPs) will be the unrelenting venue used to
satisfy the curiosities of man as we seek an understanding
of space through various experiments (also referred to as
payloads) conducted in microgravity. The NASA
Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) continues to serve
as the lead for the review and assessment of payload
hardware to assure facility and crew safety. This is the
second in a series of papers and presentations that
illustrate challenges and lessons learned in the areas of
connnunication, safety requirements, and processes
which have been vital to the PSRP.
1. BACKGROUND
For the Third International Association for the
Advancement of Space Safety (IAASS) Conference in
2008, a team of contract Safety and Mission Assurance
(S&MA) Payload Safety Engineers (PSEs), PSE Team
and Technical Leads, and a NASA PSRP Chairman set
out to review key lessons learned within Payload Safety
in an effort to assess how specific and strategic planning
will ensure success for future endeavors [1]. The team
focused on three main areas in reviewing past
experiences and planning for the future: communication,
safety requirements, and processes. For the Fourth
IAASS Conference, four members of the team remained
the same, and a NASA PSRP Executive Officer (XO)
was also added for additional perspective. The focus of
the team remained on the same three main areas.
communication, safety requirements, and processes, with
an emphasis added to expanding horizons within these
areas.
This section serves as a `snapshot of 2010' so the readers
have both a glimpse into the current state of NASA and
the PSRP. as well as a look into planned future process
improvements and discussions occurring with the ISS
experiment safety review panels.
1.1 NASA 2010
NASA stands at a pivotal point in its history, with a still-
evolving and presently unknown future. Decisions have
been made to retire the Space Shuttle, at the conclusion
of Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 (delineated as October 1, 2009-
September 30, 2010). This decision was tempered,
however, with provisions to complete the remaining three
Shuttle flights without undue schedule pressure, allowing
the retirement to be extended into FY 2011, as necessary.
Additional proposals have been announced affecting the
life of both the ISS and the Constellation Programs
(CXP); the former of which increased the life of the ISS
until 2020 and possibly longer. The future of the CxP,
which was developing NASA's follow-on vehicle to the
Space Shuttle, however, is still being negotiated at the
highest level of the United States (U.S.) Government and
is undecided at present.
Commercial Orbital Transportation Services (COTS)
Vehicles are being developed for delivering cargo and
crew to the ISS to augment the Russian Space Agency's
(Roscosmos) Soyuz and Progress, the European Space
Agency's (ESA) Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV) and
the Japan Aerospace and Exploration Agency's (JAXA)
H-11 Transfer Vehicle (HTV). NASA and the COTS
vehicle developers are undergoing  an intensive program
of design and capability evaluations to assure the safety
of the ISS facility and its crew. These changes result in a
shift of NASA's focus to one that is centered now mostly
on the ISS and have resulted in discussions and
conjecture related to both how the safety panels will be
utilized along with speculation over the potential merging
of the various safety panels to maximize efficiencies in
the challenges of a modern budget-conscious
environment.
1.2 NASA PSRP 2010
Chartered by NASA in the 1970s, today, the PSRP
supports both the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) and the
ISS Program (ISSP). The PSRP Charter was updated in
August 2009 to become an ISS Joint Program Directive
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(JPD) replacing the previous Johnson Space Center (JSC)
Policy Charter (JPC). The update included formal
recognition of the PSRP authority delegation to PSRP IP
Franchises and formally expanded the scope of the PSRP
to review payloads planned to be operated on the ISS and
transported via not only the Space Shuttle, but also on IP
and/or other ISS visiting vehicles [2][3].
The PSRP processed 449 payload Safety Data Packages
(SDPs) in FY 2008, resulting in approximately 150
formal (full-panel review/discussion) NASA PSRP Flight
Safety Reviews (FSRs) and 280 informal (Outside-Of-
Board (OOB) or partial panel review/discussion) FSRs.
In FY 2009, there were 435 SDPs submitted and
dispositioned, resulting in approximately 110 formal and
300 informal NASA PSRP FSRs, respectively.
The Space Shuttle and ISSP have successfully completed
a total of 22 vehicle missions (21 to ISS) since the first
paper in this series was written in 2008. The final
servicing of the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) was
among the eight Shuttle missions and was both extremely
challenging and highly successful. The Russian IP also
launched five Soyuz missions and seven Progress flights,
including the launch and installation of a Mini-Research
Module (MRM)-2. providing additional capabilities and
available on-orbit volume for future ISS utilization. In
addition, JAXA transported an extraordinary number of
payloads (41) on their first HTV launch to ISS and
demonstrated a tremendous accomplishment with their
first unmanned launch vehicle to support ISS utilization
and resupply.
1.3 PSRP Franchise Activities
NASA and ESA completed the Second Joint Formal
Audit of the ESA PSRP franchise in March 2007,
resulting in NASA granting full autonomy to the ESA
PSRP franchise for the conduct of experiment flight
safety review activities. In their third year of independent
operations, the ESA PSRP continues to demonstrate
compliance to the objectives and agreements as
documented within the NASA/ESA PSRP franchise
charter and Joint Development Plan (SSP 50695)
[4][5[[6]. The Fourth NASA/ESA Joint PSRP franchise
audit is scheduled for July 2010. Bi-lateral Technical
Agreements for Structures/Mechanisms and Electrical
Systems between the ESA and NASA Engineering
Directorates are currently being finalized by the two
sides' technical specialists.
NASA and JAXA agreed to charter a JAXA-based PSRP
franchise on May 22, 2009 (the format being used for the
franchise is the JAXA Safety Review Panel (SRP)) [7],
and the Joint Development Plan (JDP) between NASA
and JAXA was officially signed on November 26, 2009
[8]. An audit checklist between the NASA PSRP and
JAXA SRP is being developed with the first joint audit
tentatively planned for September 2010.
Following the first joint NASA/JAXA FSRs conducted in
Tsukuba, Japan in November 2009. the JAXA SRP has
been authorized to review experiments for the NSTS/ISS
13830 [9] classifications of "Basic" payloads thru Phase
III, "Intermediate" payloads thru Phase II and "Complex"
payloads thru Phase I. The NASA/JAXA "Bilateral
Protocol on Cooperation in the Field of Operations Safety
Support to the ISS Safety Review Process", which is an
agreement which specifies the roles and responsibilities
relating to operations safety participation in the safety
review process, was also successfully signed and
distributed in February 2010 [10]. Both
Structures/Mechanisms and Fracture Control Bi-lateral
Technical Agreements are at present being evaluated for
approval by NASA-Joluison Space Center (JSC) and
JAXA legal representatives.
NASA is facing transitions in 2010 and 2011 which bring
a large measure of uncertainty. Which pro grams end and
which continue are decisions that are outside the realm of
the PSRP's influence. The purpose of the NASA and IP
safety cormnunities, however, must remain steadfast and
focused towards the ever-vigilant pursuit of crew safety
essential for the development of space, human
exploration, and scientific study.
2. COMMUNICATION
The ability of two or more parties to discuss a specific
topic is more than just the exchange of words. Culture
and language issues between peoples of different
countries can impede cotmnunication attempts. Within
the U.S. space program, cultural and language differences
exist from one corporation to the next and between
government and industry. This will become more
pronounced as the COTS process results in additional
providers of launch services. A major responsibility of
the ISS safety community is to assure communication
differences do not hinder upon the safety of the payload.
2.1 Efficiencies in Communication
As changes have transpired at NASA, the PSRP has
looked for and trade efficiencies in the way personnel
(both internal and external to NASA) communicate. The
following represent only a few of the more recent
advances in PSRP processes.
Merging Calendars and Daily Teleconferences
While it is not yet clear if the NASA PSRP and the ISS
SRP will indeed merge to become just one panel, at this
juncture, strides have been made to promote
carmnunication and understanding between the safety
panels. As part of this activity, key panel members have
been engaged in cross-panel training. The practice of
sharing panel members is not a new concept as many of
the individual team members that represent particular
offices or directorates on the two panels are actually
shared personnel between the two panels (for example:
Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) Representatives,
Space Life Sciences Representatives, and Crew Office
Representatives). What is new is the motivation by which
the cross-panel training is taking place. The panel
positions involved: Panel Chairs, XOs, and Contractor
Safety Engineers, allow for a more detailed view into the
differences and similarities between the two panels. This
has also brought about efficiencies in communications
such that accidental double-booking of key personnel is
eliminated.
The PSRP and SRP Coordination Offices, run by two
separate Data Administrators and support staff, have
worked together to develop a joint calendar. The calendar
identifies the formal meetings scheduled for each panel,
the Chair and XO that will reside at the review, data
delivery dates, and program flight readiness meetings.
This calendar is published on both the PSRP and SRP
websites. Additional planning information, such as
personnel availability and flight planning dates, is kept
unpublished to the general public, but remains a crucial
element for successful integration of the two offices and
safety panel support.
The PSRP and SRP Coordination Offices have also
joined to hold brief daily teleconferences with the safety
teams. Formerly just a PSRP teleconference, the daily
tag-ups have transformed into a joint activity to discuss
upcoming meetings and schedules for the week and to
accommodate as-needed coordination and concise
discussions on urgent topics.
PSRP Franchises
In the PSRP franchise concept, NASA and the IPs have
developed a practical and measurable way to promote
NASA/IP relationships, further the knowledge base of
safety and proven applications of Payload Safety, and
decrease transoceanic travel expenses for all sides
involved.
NASA maintains cognizance of the activities of the
franchised panels through consistent communication via
Liaison Safety Engineers who work one-on-one with the
ESA and JAXA Safety Engineers. This allows for NASA
to assist the development of the franchise and for NASA
to obtain insight into the daily functioning of the
franchised IP safety panel.
Use of routine informal NASA-franchise panel
teleconferences allows opportunities for problem
resolution and planning for upcoming flights. Currently,
NASA PSRP XOs and PSEs hold a weekly meeting with
their ESA counterparts to discuss pressing on-orbit
issues, major reviews scheduled for the ESA PSRP, as
well as any open work remaining for upconung flights. A
monthly teleconference is also conducted between the
PSRP Chairs, XOs, and their ESA Chairs and XO
counterparts. Plans for a standing weekly meeting
between NASA and JAXA are being finalized; however,
NASA and JAXA hold meetings at least twice a month to
discuss any open payload issues, upcoming meetings, and
the development and/or expansion of franchise process
documents/agreements-
The monthly PSRP Internal Meeting also provides a
format for more general coirimunication between NASA
and the franchised panels. The meeting agenda focuses
on current policy concerns being worked by the PSRP,
lessons learned, and future planning. Within the NASA
PSRP, we have now realized, however, that the term
"internal" may appear to signify that our IP's
representatives should not attend. Certainly the intent has
arrays been to have our IPs participating and actively
involved and contributing to any adjustments to the PSRP
process with which we all are tasked to comply. (Note:
As a result of this feedback from one of our IP safety
colleagues recently, the NASA PSRP leadership is now
reviewing alternate names for the "internal meeting;"
current contenders are "PSRP Special Topics" or the
"Monthly PSRP Policies and Practices (MP3)").
ESA and JAXA PSRP franchise representatives are
strongly encouraged and welcome to participate and to
bring forward any issues, concerns, or requested
clarifications and suggested policy updates. Their
participation also promotes consistency amongst the
NASA PSRP and franchised PSRPs for policy and./or
processes and helps maintain the high standards of
innovation and inclusion core to the PSRP ideals.
2.2 Communication Challenges in Real-time
Operations
With ISS operations almost fully transitioned from
assembly to utilization, the communication challenges
related to experiments are becoming much more
extensive. To that end, it's essential to understand the
various nuances in how IP safety organizations approach
real-time operations.
As a result of previous lessons learned with unclear or
misunderstood ISS on-orbit management direction and
authority, NASA PSEs are now learning to more
effectively utilize the ISS Mission Evaluation Room
(MER) Safety Console and ISS Operations team to its
full capabilities. The same is true with IP payloads that
experience issues or anomalies on-orbit. Communication
with the various IP safety teams do have some distinct
differences, however, and the IP safety organizations do
not always mirror that of the NASA PSRP. NASA PSEs
were quick to coordinate with their ESA PSRP
counterparts when an on-orbit issue arose with a recent
externally-attached ESA ISS experiment. This proved to
be inefficient since it was determined later that, unlike
the NASA PSRP PSE function, the ESA PSRP PSEs job
responsibilities and task orders do not always include
support to the real-times ISS operations team (and
therefore they were not in possession of the very latest
on-orbit experiment status). The majority of the ESA on-
orbit status and issues are worked through the ESA
Operations Safety Unit via the ESA Product Assurance
and Safety Officer (PASO) Console. Unlike the NASA
side, generally the ESA PSRP Safety Engineers are not
involved in support for on-orbit issues unless those on-
orbit issues result in updates to Hazard Reports (HRs)
and are thus re-boarded within the formal ESA PSRP for
formal disposition.
From the NASA PSRP history, however, there have been
numerous situations in ISS memory in which the
operations management team has requested specific
NASA PSRP opinion and responses on real-time, on-
orbit situations (via requests from the Marshall Space
Flight Center (MSFC) Payload Operations and
Integration Center (POIC), the ISS Mission Management
Team (IMMT), or MER Safety Console). The NASA
PSRP continues to work with the real-time community to
clearly establish our roles/responsibilities and lines of
communication in order to provide support as efficiently
as possible.
2.3 Communication Transitions for the Future
Increased communication, knowledge transfer and
continuous training are fundamental for the future
success of the PSRP. Given that the ISS SRP workload
may decrease with the delivery of the last key ISS
elements later this year, it is also imperative that NASA
retains its current skilled safety workforce and also help
adapt those technical specialists to support the ISS
utilization phase. To help with that goal, the PSRP and
SRP have been collaborating on efforts planned for the
future era of ISS operations.
Cross Training of Chairs and Executive Officers
(XOs)
NASA and its contractors have been looking into ways to
optimize efficiencies within NASA's ISS SRP and PSRP.
As part of this evaluation, the SRP and the PSRP have
been engaged in cross-training of the key panel positions
that was discussed previously. This affords an
opportunity for the Chairs to support and evaluate the
strengths of the panels and to find areas of synergy.
Communication within each panel is decidedly different,
based on the perceived knowledge of space industry
safety requirements by the hardware provider and
familiarity of the previously flown hardware to the panel.
ISS hardware/non-experiment cargo, reviewed by SRP,
has specific operational necessity and failure can result in
loss of se gment operability or other subsequent hazards.
This contrasts with the PSRP's subject of review.
Experiments are not vital for crew survival. The safety
focus of the SRP, therefore, tends to emphasize
reliability, maintainability and the subsequent effects of
hardware failure on the ISS mission.
The following have been noted as areas where the
differences in the panels are fairly profound:
- Document management practices
-	 Safety panel composition
- OOB approval processes
- Focus of safety impacts
- Safety backgrounds for hardware providers
The challenge in any future safety panel combination
efforts will be first to understand all the differences
between the two processes and then to determine how
best to integrate the best of both worlds to create a sound
and efficient safety review process for both types of ISS
equipment (without sacrificing key details of either).
3. SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
The cornerstone of any safety review process lies in the
quality and clarity of its imposed requirements. In truth, a
safety review panel which does not or cannot periodically
assess the strength and weakness of its requirements and
which cannot identify and implement necessary changes
is one which will be significantly weaker in the face of
evolving technologies, gained knowledge/experience and
scientific developments. In order for a strong safety
culture to continue to live and prosper within NASA, it is
therefore essential that safety requirements constantly be
reviewed and updated as events dictate.
3.1 Efficiencies in Safety Requirements
The following efficiencies have been implemented and
applied to PSRP safety requirements.
SSP 51700, "Payload Safety Policy and Requirements
for the International Space Station"
The baselined SSP 51700 is designed to be a
consolidation of the NSTS 1700.713 and NSTS 1700.713
ISS Addendum requirements documents, as they
presently exist, focused on payloads operated/stowed on
ISS [11][12][13]. In the current requirements
architecture, Payload Organizations (POs) are required to
possess an understanding of both National Space
Transportation System (NSTS) documents; comparing
the baseline core Shuttle payload safety document and
the ISS Addendum text side by side in order to fully
understand the requirements of the ISS Addendum. In
addition, both of these documents currently use the
Shuttle Configuration Management (CM) system. The
new SSP 51700 baseline instead places that CM
responsibility into the ISSP realm.
The additional benefit of the SSP 51700 concept is that
the safety requirements for payloads operating on ISS are
referenced in one document; this provides a convenient
venue where the POs may locate any and all applicable
requirements no matter their planned ISS on-orbit
location or operational scenario.
As presented at the April 20, 2010 Multilateral Safety
and Mission Assurance Panel (MS&MAP), the transition
of having a Shuttle-managed versus ISS-managed set of
requirements also allows the PSRP to continue updating
requirements well past the life of the Space Shuttle
Program [14]. This provides the IPs the ability to
distribute and filter any proposed technical changes or
comments to requirements updates via the formal ISS
CM system. The current distribution lists of the Shuttle
CM do not include the IPs, and as such, the PSRP has
been forced to coordinate IP comments to change
requests outside of the formal Shuttle CM system via the
Joint American Russian Safety Working Group
(JARSWG), the MS&MAP, and other NASA PSRP
dedicated discussion forums.
The current plan for the SSP 51700 document is to issue
a baseline initial release in May 2010. This document
introduces no new technical changes from the NSTS
1700.713 ISS Addendum: instead, it reformats the
existing requirements into a common ISS requirements
standard. Following that release, a technical revision will
then be issued that addresses many of the necessary
technical requirements updates (also known as: "Change
Requests" (CRs)) presently in draft within the NASA
PSRP and which are still being developed and refined.
To date, the NASA/IP community has provided 71
comments for the first revision. Transport specific
requirements have been removed from SSP 51700 in lieu
of pointers to the respective launch vehicle requirements
and to SSP 57008, the "Unique Pressurized Payload Non-
Rack Interface Control Document Template [15]".
NSTS/ISS 13830, Section 7 "Supporting Technical
Data Submittals"
In October 2009, the PSRP successfully updated
NSTS/ISS 13830, Section 7 to clarify required data
expected from POs within delivered SDPs. This change
was as a result of common questions and requests for
additional data from the NASA PSRP technical support,
including: verification plans for structural integrity and
submittal of mechanical systems verification plans and
reports, wiring, bonding and grounding schematics, etc.
Given the history of these requests, those deliverables
(amongst others) are now clearly stated in NSTS/ISS
13830 and imposed on the PO, allowing for more
efficient use of review meeting time.
In addition to clarifying these existing data submittals,
the NASA PSRP also included new data deliverable
requirements for information regarding possible payload
impacts to the ISS plasma/floating potential and the JSC
Form (JF) 713 "Inflight Biohazardous Materials
Approval Form" [16]. All of these updated and new
requirements seek to improve the flight safety review
process by clarifying the expectations of the PSRP during
the preparation and conduct of the experiment safety
review.
In addition, given the large number of possible launch
vehicles and ISS operational scenarios, the PSRP has also
begun focusing on the launch safety of experiments
planned for ISS and the concept of "safe on arrival" as
part of the ISS FSR process.
Demonstration of Safety Compliance for IP Vehicles,
Segments, and "Safe on Arrival" Principle
Similar to the SSP 51700 concept, the SSP 57008
document allows the reader to easily find necessary
requirements in a central location. However. unlike SSP
51700 ; SSP 57008 focuses on the unique environmental
requirements for the various ISS modules (U.S.
Operating Segment (USOS), Columbus (COL), Japanese
Experiment Module (JEM)) and/or IP vehicles (Progress,
Soyuz, Shuttle, ATV, HTV) [15]. It can be thought of as
a "Common Interface Control Document (ICD)" for
experiments on the ISS and denotes applicable ungiue
temperature requirements, pressure, loads, shock,
vibration limits, etc.
As a practical example, one could imagine an experiment
planned for launch on an ESA ATV, transferred through
the Russian Service Module (SM), stowed in the JAXA
JEM, moved into the ESA Columbus (COL) module for
the operation, and then either returned on a Russian
Soyuz or disposed aboard a Russian Progress. Given the
large number of transport and ISS environmental
conditions, it is easy to see that the PO could become
quickly overwhelmed with the number of unique
requirements levied by the IP owners.
SSP 57008 assists the PO in documenting all those
applicable requirements in one document, and is
maintained by the NASA-ISS Payloads Office; working
in close cooperation with the ISSP and IPs. SSP 57008
also assists the PO in the ability to clearly demonstrate
the concept of "safe on arrival" for their experiment
hardware after transport on the IP vehicle.
As part of the requirement to demonstrate ISS flight
safety to the NASA PSRP, it must be shown (and
documented in associated payload HRs) that the
equipment will arrive on ISS in a safe state after
undergoing all applicable transport vehicle loading, with
hazard controls fully in place, structures intact, levels of
containment secure, etc. Thus, as part of the payload
safety verification program for ISS, applicable transport
vehicle and operational environments must be clearly
known, properly assessed (via pre-flight analysis, testing,
etc.) and succinctly documented within the ISS on-orbit
experiment safety data.
It is with this assurance of ISS on-orbit safety, first and
foremost, that provides the confidence to the IP
launch/return vehicle provider that the hardware is safe
for the transport phase as well. If the hardware has been
designed and tested to be safe and intact upon first hatch
opening and operations on the ISS.. then of course, it is
logical to assume that it has also been tested and designed
as safe for the passive transportation phase within the IP
launch vehicle.
That said, a piece of hardware may always have those
unique launch vehicle integration assessments for which
review authority resides completely between the payload
developer and IP safety organization, and those unique
launch vehicle assessments must be coordinated and
completed between the IP and PO prior to final approval
for delivery to and operations aboard the ISS. However,
given that the bulk of the experiments reviewed today
(and which will most likely be the same for the future)
are simple, soft-stowed and non-structurally mounted (for
launch and on-orbit), the SSP 57008 effectively serves
the majority of the experiment hardware providers for
understanding important launch vehicle environmental
effects. It also promises to be quite beneficial for the
near future in which NASA can no longer rely on the
Space Shuttle to meet the ISS experiment delivery and
return needs, and instead looks to our IP and commercial
launch services providers. Thus, we gain efficiencies by
using SSP 57008.
3.2 Safety Requirements Transitions for the Future
The future holds many more efficiency improvements for
the PSRP. SSP 51700 is currently being evaluated for
Revision A which will clarify several requirements and
perhaps begin to replace NASA-specific requirements
currently not as palatable to the IPs. Future revisions of
SSP 51700 may also involve sufficient clarification of
requirements such that the interpretation letters in
NSTS/ISS 18798 may no longer be required [17].
NASA PSRP and ISS CM representatives are also
developing a plan to transition both the NSTS/ISS 18798
and NSTS/ISS 13830 from a SSP lead in the CM area to
the ISSP. The NASA PSRP looks forward to the future,
and will continue to adapt and correct its course as
needed to meet ISSP direction as it is received.
4. PROCESSES
PSRP Processes, the particular method of reviewing
payloads for flight, generally involve a number of steps
or operations from receipt of a payload SDP to approval
of a payload for flight. The PSRP has adjusted to work
with the ISS IP environment. As we approach the
impending retirement of the Space Shuttle, and are faced
with the challenge of limited resources coupled with
increased demand for ISS utilization, the NASA PSRP
finds itself required to develop efficiencies and
innovations in the methods in which we conduct the
PSRP processes.
4.1 Efficiencies in Processes
The following efficiencies have been implemented and
applied to PSRP processes.
PSRP Franchises
The PSRP franchise concept is one of the key efficiencies
in the area of ISS utilization. The core of the PSRP
franchise is the concept of safety review panel delegation.
By entrusting the review authority to the
recognized/approved IP franchise safety panels, the
NASA PSRP is able to focus its review attention to the
U.S. payloads or those which absolutely require NASA
PSRP joint review.
Such examples could be the case for ESA or JAXA
experiments operated within the Russian module, where
IP-to-IP franchise agreements have not yet been
established or negotiated between the two IP safety
organizations.
The establishment of PSRP franchise agreements also
assists NASA for the scope of review for NASA
payloads on IP launch/return vehicles. Per the current
bilateral franchise agreements with the ESA PSRP and
JAXA SRP, U.S. payloads meeting the requirements of
the ATV and HTV and which have completed their
review with the NASA PSRP for safe ISS operations
(and which encompass the launch requirements already
for the "safe on arrival" concept) do not require extensive
additional IP re-review for the planned transport on those
IP vehicles. This benefit is now being fully realized with
the apparent, almost complete reliance on IP launch
vehicles to sustain NASA utilization requests (pending
development and further exploration of the coinrnercial
launch services projects).
Flight Safety Certification
A noteworthy efficiency enacted in the 2007 timeframe
and which is now searing quite useful in current
operations is the transition from the original JF-1114A
"Certificate of NSTS/ISS Payload Safety Compliance" to
the JF-906, "Flight Safety Certificate" [18][19].
This new form offers a great deal of benefits from the
ori ginal. POs are able to document fli ght safety
compliance for the U.S. Space Shuttle and operations
within the USOS, show safety compliance to launch and
disposal on IP vehicles (HTV, ATV, Progress, Soyuz),
and document safe operations/stowage within the various
ISS IP modules/segments. It is a form accepted by all IPs
and is also used for non-experimental hardware within
the SRP and the Flight Equipment Safety and Reliability
Review Panel (FESRRP) processes.
This new multilateral safety form, in addition to the
common requirements philosophy established via the
PSRP franchising concept, allows for direct IP-to-IP
reco gnition and discussions. Such a direct IP-to-IP
communications philosophy is crucial for the expansion
of IP relationships and processes and is the fundamental
concept of the ISS program: the growth of international
partnerships while expanding the horizons of space and
human research.
4.2 Process Transitions for the Future
With respect to the numerous challenges facing the
program in the upconning years (budget, available launch
vehicles, expedited manifesting requests and the need for
rapid turnaround of safety reviews for urgent cargo, etc.),
the NASA PSRP is considering additional process
improvements for the future of the ISS.
Submittal Timeframe (45 Day Requirement)
The current 45 day requirement for the review of
experiment SDPs is under strong consideration for
review. With the varying complexities of experiment
hardware launched to and operated on the ISS, it has
become apparent that the 45 day review requirement may
be further refined to better balance the workload of the
panel support versus the difficulty of the subject's
technical data.
For simple series/reflight hardware or consumables
resupply, many of which are reviewed OOB with the
PSRP Chair and PSE (versus a full in-board FSR with the
complete PSRP present), it is often unnecessary to
request a full 45 day review timeframe. In fact, the
recent change request in NSTS/ISS 13830 [9], Section 9
which instituted a simplified series/reflight process for
lower risk hardware fully supports this philosophy. A
new characterization of the minimum acceptable
timeframe is currently under discussion.
JSC Form 1230
An additional effort which has been in work for almost a
year, and which is only now nearing completion, is a
major update/rewrite of the JF-1230, "Standard Hazards"
template [20]. This update corrects many of the major
challenges that both Payload Developers and the PSRP
community have struggled with over the years.
Commonly requested attachments (wiring schematics,
required tables; listing of vented containers, etc.) have all
now been added into the verbiage/instructions  to ease
with a PO's utilization of the form. Additionally, each
section has been closely reviewed and hazard controls
updated to reflect the current philosophy of the PSRP.
The new form is expected to reduce the amount of
required time needed in-board to discuss "standard
hazards" that, at present, bo g down the panel in process
arguments versus true technical discussions related to the
payload itself.
5. CONCLUSION
After the retirement of the Space Shuttle, it is anticipated
by some that while there may be a reduction in the total
amount of scientific hardware and experiments flying  to
and returning from ISS. there will be an increase in the
amount of science being performed as a result of a
funding shift from ISS assembly to ISS utilization.
Also, since the Space Shuttle has had a unique capability
to allow sortie operation of experiments without leaving
the launch vehicle (and thus not requiring additional ISS
volume for operations) this may become a lost flexibility
with its retirement, directly impacting a number of
current and prospective future POs that previously
needed only a brief period on orbit and/or a small volume
to conduct and then return their experimental research.
The ISS faces a critical time in the next several years as
the ISSP balances the increased demands for ISS
utilization while having to adapt to near complete
reliance on foreign launch entities until such time that the
commercial space industry or still To-Be-Determined
(TBD) NASA next-generation spacecraft can be decided
and constructed.
The PSRP process, however, whether it be conducted by
NASA or one of the recognized and delegated IP
franchised safety organizations, stands prepared to meet
those challenges and support the needs of the ISSP, the
citizens of the world, and most importantly, the crew who
have dedicated and continue to risk their lives dail y for
the development and utilization of microgravity research
and exploration. It is a task that we in the PSRP do not
take lightly, and for which we dedicate our own lives to
do properly and correctly each and every time.
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Purpose of Paper
"State of the NASA PSRP"
• Recent PSRP efficiencies
• Communication and interactions with IPs
• Payload Safety and ISS operations
• Requirements innovations/updates
• Required transitions and future challenges
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Payload Safety Background
• Chartered by NASA in the 1970s, the NASA Payload Safety Review Panel(PSRP) began conducting reviews of payload flight hardware or Flight Safety
Reviews (FSRs) in 1979 in support of the Space Shuttle Program
• Comprised of panel members and technical support representing key NASA-
JSC directorates, IP Safety Communities, and other ad-hoc members, the
NASA PSRP is tasked with the following:
Interpretation of safety requirements and provide recommendations for
implementation and/or interpretation
— Evaluate modifications to hardware that either affect a safety critical
subsystem or create a potential hazard to the vehicle or crew
— Evaluate safety analyses, safety reports, and non-compliant conditions
P
Assure the resolution of safety issues
Provides support to both the Space Shuttle and ISS Programs, including reviewkk&"Of experiments destined to ISS and transported on commercial launch vehicles
I
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Communication
n i n g efforts
• Efficiencies
— SRP & PSRP consolidation/processes
• Calendar merging
• Daily planning tag-ups
— PSRP franchises
• ESA PSRP & JAXA SRP
• Weekly/monthly IP teleconferences
• Technical agreement developments
• Operations
— ISS safety consoles & PSRP interactions in real-time operations
— Coordination with IP safety representatives
• Transitions/Future Planning
i	 — Post-Shuttle retirement and IP interactions
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Safety Requirements
• Efficiencies/Operations
— SSP 51700, "Vision 1700" status
— Configuration Management (CM) challenges (post-shuttle)
— NSTS/ISS 13830 updates/additions
— Use of SSP 57008, "Common Payload ICD"
— "Safe on Arrival" concept
• Transitions/Future Planning
— NSTS/ISS 13830 transition to SSP "xxxxx"
— NSTS/ISS 18798 transition
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Processes
• Efficiencies/Operations
— IP franchises and distribution of PSRP workload
— IP transport vehicle safety assessments
— JF-906 7 "Flight Safety Certificate"
— "IP4IP" common requirements philosophy/processes
• Transitions/Future Planning
— Expedited reviews and minimum safety review timeframes
— JF-1230, "Standard Hazards" Template Updates
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Parting Thoughts
• Increased ISS utilization direction and PSRP impacts
• Future challenges/required process changes
— Commercial launch services (TBD)
— Reliance on IP transportation vehicles
— Resource challenges
• Expedited payloads and late manifesting
• Communication, communication, communication!
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